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Abstract
This paper presents a nonparametric, revealed preference analysis of intertemporal
consumption with risk. In an experimental setting, subjects allocate tokens over four
commodities, consisting of consumption in two contingent states and at two time
periods, subject to different budget constraints. With this data, one could test, using
Afriat’s Theorem and its generalizations, whether a subject’s choices are consistent with
utility maximization, and also utility maximization with various additional properties
on the utility function. Our results broadly support a model where subjects maximize
a utility function that is weakly separable across states but there is little support for
weak separability across time. Our result sheds light on the source of the failure of the
discounted expected utility model.
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1 Introduction
Many important economic decisions involve agents choosing among alternatives that differ in
both their risk and time properties. The canonical way of representing preferences in this
context is to combine the expected utility and discounted utility models into what is known
as the discounted expected utility (DEU) model, which evaluates the utility of a contingent
consumption plan (c˜1, c˜2, c˜3, ...) as
(1)
∑
t
δtE [u (c˜t)] ,
where c˜t is the random consumption in period t and δt is the corresponding discount factor.
With (additive) separability across both time periods and states, DEU has the great advantage
of being a simple and tractable model which can deliver sharp conclusions in different applied
contexts. However, this simplicity also means that the model cannot distinguish between an
agent’s attitude towards risk and his attitude towards intertemporal consumption. For this
reason and others, alternative models have been proposed, which dispenses with separability
either across states or across time (e.g., Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Selden, 1978; Epstein and
Zin, 1989; Chew and Epstein,1990; and Halevy, 2008; see Section 1.1 for a more detailed
discussion). Notably, some of these models have been shown to capture a broader domain of
phenomena, such as the equity premium puzzle (Epstein and Zin, 1991).
In this paper, we design an experiment which will allow us to find out, using purely
nonparametric methods, the source of the departure from the DEU model. In our experiment,
subjects allocate experimental tokens to four commodities, which pay out in two states s1
and s2 and two time periods t1 and t2, as follows:
t1 t2
s1 c11 c12
s2 c21 c22
The two states s1 and s2 are set to be equiprobable, while t1 and t2 are one week later and
nine weeks later respectively. Subjects allocate 100 tokens by choosing c = (c11, c12, c21, c22)
subject to the budget constraint
(2) p11c11 + p12c12 + p21c21 + p22c22 ≤ 100.
We present subjects with different budget sets by varying the price vector p = (p11, p12, p21, p22),
with each subject making an allocation decision in a total of 41 budget sets. Eliciting
preferences from budgetary decisions is becoming a fairly common experimental practice, but
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ours is the first experiment in which subjects choose among affordable alternatives where
payoffs vary in two dimensions, i.e., in both state and time.
From each subject, we obtain a dataset with 41 observations, with each each observation
i consisting of a price vector pi = (p11, p12, p21, p22) and the corresponding choice c
i =
(c11, c12, c21, c22) made by the subject at that price vector. Throughout the paper, we apply
(nonparametric) revealed preference methods to test alternative hypotheses on a subject’s
utility function U defined on the contingent consumption plan c ∈ R4+. At the most general,
we ask whether the subject is maximizing some well-behaved (i.e., strictly increasing and
continuous) utility function U . In other words, we ask whether there exists a function U
such that the subject is choosing optimally given his budget; formally, at every observation i,
we require U(ci) ≥ U(c) for all c satisfying the budget constraint (2), with p = pi. Afriat’s
Theorem (see Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982)) establishes that a data set O = {(pi, ci)}41i=1
is consistent with this utility-maximization hypothesis if and only if it obeys GARP (the
generalized axiom of revealed preference), a property which is computationally straightforward
to check.
If the subject is maximizing discounted expected utility, then (with equiprobable states)
(3) U(c11, c12, c21, c22) =
1
2
u(c11) +
1
2
δu(c12) +
1
2
u(c21) +
1
2
δu(c22).
for some increasing function u and δ ∈ (0, 1). DEU is a special case of a utility function that
is weakly separable across states, which has the general form
U(c11, c12, c21, c22) = F (υ(c11, c12), υ˜(c21, c22)),
where υ (υ˜) is the sub-utility function over consumption streams in state 1 (state 2) and
F aggregates over the two sub-utilities. (In the DEU case, υ(c11, c12) = u(c11) + δu(c12),
υ˜(c21, c22) = u(c11) + δu(c12) and F is the simple average between these two sub-utilities.)
The DEU form is also a special case of a utility function that is weakly separable across time,
which has the general form
U(c11, c12, c21, c22) = G(ω(c11, c21), ω˜(c12, c22)).
In this case, ω (ω˜) is a sub-utility function over state-contingent consumption at date 1 (date
2) and the two sub-utilites are aggregated by the function G.
If a subject is a DEU maximizer, his dataset O = {(pi, ci)}41i=1 will obey properties beyond
GARP. In particular, the subject’s choice of consumption stream in state 1 must maximize the
sub-utility over consumption streams in state 1 that incur the same cost or less, and similarly
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for state 2. In other words, cis1 = (c
i
11, c
i
12) must be optimal at price p
i
s1
= (pi11, p
i
12) in the
sense that υ(cis1) ≥ υ(c11, c12) for all (c11, c12) obeying (pi11, pi12)·(c11, c12) ≤ (pi11, pi12)·(ci11, ci12).
Therefore, if O is collected from a DEU maximizer, or more generally from a subject with a
utility function weakly separable across states, the spliced data sets Os1 = {(pis1 , cis1)}41i=1 and
Os2 = {(pis2 , cis2)}41i=1 will both obey GARP.
By a similar logic, if a data set is collected from a DEU maximizer or more generally from
an agent with a utility function that is weakly separable across time, then GARP holds if O
is spliced along the time dimension, i.e., Ot1 = {(pit1 , cit1)}41i=1 and Ot2 = {(pit2 , cit2)}41i=1 will
both obey GARP, where pit1 = (p
i
11, p
i
21) and c
i
t1
= (ci11, c
i
21).
When we test the data for these properties, we find that, in general, O obeys GARP and
so does Os1 and Os2 , but that is not true of Ot1 and Ot2 . In other words, there is general
support for utility maximization broadly defined and also for the existence of sub-utility
functions defined on consumption streams, but there is weak support for sub-utility functions
defined on contingent consumption. Furthermore, there is evidence that the sub-utility
function on consumption streams is the same in both states, i.e., υ = υ˜ and also that this
sub-utlity function exhibits impatience, i.e., one could find a rationalization of Os1 such
that υ(x, y) ≥ υ(y, x) whenever x ≥ y. Testing for rationalizability with a utility function
exhibiting impatience requires a strengthening of the GARP property (see Nishimura, Ok,
and Quah (2017)).
These results suggest that, for most subjects, a utility function that is weakly across states
but not necessarily across time captures their behavior well. Indeed, there is a generalization
of Afriat’s thoerem to test for rationalizabitliy with a weakly separable utility function (see
Quah (2014)). Using this test, we find that 26% of the subjects satisfy both state and time
separability (approximately), 50% of the subjects satisfy state separability but not time
separability, 4% of the subjects satisfy time separability but not state separability, 11% of
the subjects satisfy neither state separability nor time separability, the rest of 10% fail the
overall GARP test and are not consistent with utility-maximization for the most general
utility function U .
1.1 Related Literature
In the theoretical literature, alternative models of DEU have been proposed that relax either
state or time separability, e.g., Kreps and Porteus (1978); Selden (1978); Epstein and Zin
(1989); Chew and Epstein (1990); and Halevy (2008). Kreps and Porteus (1978) focuses on
the time neutrality property of DEU, i.e., DEU predicts indifference between two contingent
consumption plans that both deliver c1 in period 1 and c˜2 in period 2, even though in one
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plan the uncertainty resolves at period 1 and in the other at period 2. In relaxing time
neutrality, Kreps and Porteus (1978) obtains a recursive expected utility representation that is
essentially time non-separable. Selden (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989) focus instead on the
non-distinction between risk preference and time preference in the DEU model. To illustrate,
notice that DEU reduces to expected utility E [u (c˜)] for degenerate contingent consumption
c˜, and to discounted utility
∑
δtu (ct) for a deterministic consumption stream (c1, c2, c3, ...).
Therefore, the same utility index u captures both the attitude towards risk and the attitude
towards intertemporal substitution. The utility forms proposed in both Selden (1978) and
Epstein and Zin (1978) disentangle risk preference from time preference, but Selden (1978)
relaxes state separability while Epstein and Zin (1989) relaxes time separability. Follow-up
models, including Chew and Epstein (1990) and Halevy (2008), attempt to distinguish risk
preference from time preference by incorporating non-expected utility.
A number of recent experimental studies investigate various aspects of attitude towards
intertemporal risks. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) propose an experimental design termed
Convex Time Budget (CTB) to elicit time preference. In this experiment, subjects make
allocation decisions between sooner and later payment. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) find
that the utility index for time preference elicited using CTB is distinct from the utility index
for risk elicited using price list. Relatedly, Abdellaoui et al. (2013) introduce a method to
measure utility functions for risk preference and time preference separately, and find that the
utility function under risk is more concave than the utility function over time. In another
paper, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) consider CTB under a risky environment, in which
there is a 50 percent chance of receiving the earlier payment and, independently, another 50
percent chance of receiving the later payment; they find that subjects are more responsive
to changes of interest rate in the risky environment than under certainty. Based on these
experimental results, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, b) conclude that risk preference is
distinct from time preference. Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) show theoretically that rank-
dependent probability weighting (Halevy, 2008) can account for the key findings in Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012b). Miao and Zhong (2015) also experimentally investigate intertemporal
decision making and find support for a separation between attitudes towards risk and attitudes
towards intertemporal substitution; their findings are broadly consistent with the models of
Epstein and Zin (1989), Chew and Epstein (1990), and Halevy (2008). These experimental
studies focus on the distinction between the utility index for risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution, but they do not directly test for the separability of subjects’ utility function
across states and across time. The current study provides the first experimental test examining
this issue.
The convex time budgets of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, b) is an instance in the
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experimental literature where budgetary choice decisions are employed to study preferences.
Other instances include Andreoni and Miller (2001) and Fisman, Markovits and Kariv (2007),
which study social preferences by considering modified dictator games in which the subjects
allocate tokens between herself and anonymous recipients, with the value of each token
varying across observations. Choi et al. (2007) study risk preferences by having subjects
make portfolio decisions involving contingent consumption. Our study could be thought of as
an extension of the Choi et al. (2007) experiment to one where risk and time preferences are
studied in conjunction.
Whenever budgetary decisions are analysed, it is commonplace to appeal to Afriat’s
Theorem to study rationalizability or approximate rationalizability, the latter through the
use of the critical cost efficiency index (Afriat, 1974). For example, Choi et al. (2015) find,
in a large-scale experiment with household subjects, that the level of choice consistency with
utility maximization, as measured by this index, is positively correlated to wealth. It is less
common to go beyond Afriat’s Theorem to use other revealed preference tests to evaluate the
consistency of decision making with more specific models of utility maximization; examples
of this include Polisson, Quah, and Renou (2015) for risk preference and Saito, Echenique
and Imai (2015) for time preference. The use of revealed preferences tests beyond GARP is a
feature of this paper.
1.2 Organization of the paper
Section 2 presents the experimental design. Since results in revealed preference analysis are
used extensively in the paper, these are explained in some detail in Section 3. The results of
the experiment are report in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. There is also an Appendix
with more detailed results.
2 Experiment Design
This section describes the design of our experiment, in which subjects make allocation
decisions under different budget constraints. Specifically, we provide subjects with a budget
of 100 experimental tokens which they can allocate over four date and state contingent
commodities. A typical consumption bundle can be written as c = (c11, c12, c21, c22) where cst
refers to consumption in state s at time t. The two states, determined by a coin toss, are of
equal probability; and the two time points are one week later and 9 weeks later.
The price vector p = (p11, p12, p21, p22) is obtained by having the price for each commodity
randomly selected from the set {0.5, 0.8, 1, 1.25, 2}, with at least one price being equal to
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1. This gives rise to 96 distinct price vectors. We randomly select 41 price vectors for each
subject with one of them fixed to be the benchmark vector (1, 1, 1, 1).
At the end of the experiment, each subject is paid according to one randomly selected
decision task by tossing dice according to the Random Incentive Mechanism (RIM).1 Subjects
are informed to treat each decision as if it were the sole decision determining their payments.
To control for preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution, all uncertainty is resolved
at the end of the experiment. Once the decision task is selected and the state is realized,
each subject is paid with an exchange rate of SGD 0.2 (about USD 0.15) per experimental
token. To increase the credibility of payment, subjects are paid with post-dated checks that
will not be honored by the local bank when presented prior to the date indicated. To further
control for the potential difference in transaction cost at different time points (Andreoni and
Sprenger, 2012a), subjects receive a minimum participation fee of SGD 12 (with SGD 6 for
each payday). Experimental earnings are added to these minimum payments.
We note that the experiment in this study is based on monetary reward while in most
models utility is derived from actual consumption. Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2010)
elicit discount factors for both monetary rewards and primary rewards of chocolate and find
a positive and statistically significant relation between discount rates elicited using monetary
and primary rewards. The observed correlation suggests that measurement through monetary
reward might be ecologically valid. Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2013) study time
preference over effort and show that the incentive for smoothing is higher for effort than
for monetary reward. Readers can refer to Halevy (2014) for insightful discussions on the
validity of using cash payment to elicit time preference. Notwithstanding these caveats, we
posit that our overall approach would be applicable to the settings with actual consumptions.
A total of 103 undergraduate students are recruited as participants through an adver-
tisement posted in the Integrated Virtual Learning Environment at the National University
of Singapore. The experiment is conducted at the laboratory of the Center for Behavioral
Economics at the National University of Singapore. Conducted by two of the authors and
a research assistant, the experiment consists of four sessions with 20 to 30 subjects in each
session. After the subjects arrive at the experiment venue, they are given the consent
form approved by the Institutional Review Board of the National University of Singapore.
Following that, general instructions are read aloud to the subjects, and several examples
are demonstrated to them before they started making their decisions. The experimental
instructions follow closely those in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) (See Appendix C for the
Experimental Instructions). Most of our subjects complete the tasks within 30 minutes. At
the end of the experiment, they approach the experimenters one by one, toss the dice and
1For the validity of RIM, readers can refer to Wakker (2007) for a detailed discussion.
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receive payments in post-dated checks based on their choice. On average, the subjects are
paid SGD 22.
3 Revealed Preference Analysis
In Section 3.1 we describe and explain the basic GARP condition that characterizes rational-
izability with a well-behaved utility function. In Section 3.2 we consider further properties
which we may require of a utility function rationalizing a dataset, and show how the GARP
condition could be modified to check for rationalizability with utility functions having those
properties.
3.1 GARP
We denote by pi = (pi11, p
i
12, p
i
21, p
i
22) the price vector faced by the subject in decision problem
i, and by ci = (ci11, c
i
12, c
i
21, c
i
22) the bundle chosen by the subject. Thus the collection of a
subject’s decisions for all I decision problems can be written as
O = {(p1, c1), . . . , (pI , cI)} .
We shall refer to such a collection as a dataset. A utility function U : R4+ → R rationalizes
the dataset O if, at each observation i ∈ I,2
U(ci) ≥ U(c) for all c ∈ R4+ s.t. pi · ci ≥ pi · c.
This condition states that if a subject can afford c when choosing ci, then it must be the case
that the utility derived from ci is weakly higher than that derived from c.
We refer to a utility function (or more generally any function defined on a subset of the
Euclidean space) as well-behaved if it is continuous and strictly increasing. Afriat’s Theorem
(see Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982)) provides a necessary and sufficient condition under
which a dataset can be rationalized by a well-behaved utility function. We shall now describe
that test.
Let C = {ci}i∈I be the set of bundles chosen by the subject at some observation i. Given
a dataset O, if a subject chooses ci when some cj in C is affordable (i.e., pi · ci ≥ pi · cj), then
we say that ci is directly revealed preferred to cj and denote it by ci %∗ cj. If cj is strictly
cheaper than ci (pi · ci > pi · cj), then we say that ci is directly strictly revealed preferred to cj
and denote it by ci ∗ cj. Lastly, let the revealed preferred relation be the transitive closure
2We shall abuse notation and use I to denote the number of observations as well as the set {1, 2, . . . , I}.
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Figure 1: Illustration of violations of GARP, Impatience and Symmetry. Fig 1.a depicts a violation
of GARP, since A is revealed strictly preferred to B and B is revealed strictly preferred to A. GARP
is not violated in Fig 1.b; however it is not consistent with optimization with an impatient utility
function. B is revealed strictly preferred to A and A is also revealed strictly preferred to B under the
impatience assumption, since B′ is contained in the budget set when A is chosen and the impatient
subject must prefer B′ to B. In Fig 1.c, GARP is not violated, but the data is not compatible with
maximization of a symmetric utility function. B is revealed preferred to A and, under symmetry A
is revealed preferred to B (because A is revealed preferred to B′).
of %∗, denoted as %∗∗.3 A dataset O satisfies the generalized axiom of revealed preference
(GARP) if the following holds:
(4) for all ci and cj, ci %∗∗ cj implies cj ∗ ci.
Figure 1.a depicts a violation of GARP involving two observations. It is not difficult to show
3In detail, ci %∗∗ cj if we can find i1, . . . , iK such that ci %∗ ci1 %∗ ci2 %∗ . . . %∗ ciK %∗ cj .
8
that any dataset that can be rationalized by a well-behaved utility function (indeed, by any
locally nonsatiated preference) must satisfy GARP; the substantive part of Afriat’s Theorem
establishes that GARP is also sufficient for a dataset to be rationalized by a well-behaved
utility function.
GARP tests provide 0/1 results, i.e., a subject is either consistent or inconsistent with
maximizing a specific utility function. However, a subject may behave roughly in accordance
with utility maximization but for some reason such as inattention and measurement error,
the subject does not choose the optimal bundle on all occasions. A popular approach to
measure departures from rationality to use the critical cost efficiency index (CCEI) developed
in Afriat (1972). This index, which ranges from 0 to 1, is a measure of the efficiency with
which a subject allocates his budget. Formally, a subject has a CCEI of e ∈ [0, 1] if e is the
largest number such that there is a well-behaved utility function U with
(5) U(ci) ≥ U(c) for all c ∈ R4+ s.t. pi · ci ≥ e pi · c, for all i ∈ I.
A CCEI of 1 indicates that a subject is perfectly utility-maximizing. A CCEI less than 1, say
0.95, indicates that there is a well-behaved utility function that approximately rationalizes
the data in the sense that there is a utility function for which the chosen bundle ci (at
every observation i) is preferred to any bundle that is more than 5% cheaper than ci (at the
prevailing price vector pi).
Approximate rationalizability at some coefficient e (in the sense given by (5)) can be
tested using a modified version of GARP, in which the revealed preference relation %∗e is
defined as follows: ci %∗e cj if pi · ci ≥ e pi · cj. In an analogous way, one could define ∗e, the
transitive closure %∗∗e and the no-cycling condition (4). Such a condition is necessary and
sufficient for rationalizability at that coefficient (see Afriat (1972)).
3.2 More revealed preference tests
The basic GARP test could be extended in various ways to test for more stringent conditions
on the rationalizing utility function. We confine our discussion here to those properties
which must be satisfied by any subject who maximizes a discounted expected utility function.
It follows that a rejection of any of these properties implies a rejection of the discounted
expected utility model.
Property 1: State Separability. A utility function U satisfies state separability if there
are well-behaved functions F : R2 → R, υ, υ˜ : R2+ → R, such that
(6) U (c11, c12, c21, c22) = F (υ (c11, c12) , υ˜ (c21, c22)) .
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State separability implies that the consumption stream in one state can be ordered inde-
pendently of what is obtained in the other state. Therefore, if two bundles give the same
consumption stream in (for example) state 2, then altering that stream will not change the
preferred bundle, i.e.,
t1 t2
s1 x y
s2 z w

t1 t2
s1 x
′ y′
s2 z w
⇒
t1 t2
s1 x y
s2 z
′ w′

t1 t2
s1 x
′ y′
s2 z
′ w′
Property 2: Time Separability. A utility function U satisfies time separability if there
are well-behaved functions G : R2 → R, ω, ω˜ : R2+ → R, such that
(7) U (c11, c12, c21, c22) = G (ω (c11, c21) , ω˜ (c12, c22)) .
In this case, the ranking over two bundles with the same contingent consumption at (say)
date 1 will not be altered if the date 1 contingent consumption is changed, i.e.,
t1 t2
s1 x y
s2 z w

t1 t2
s1 x y
′
s2 z w
′
⇒
t1 t2
s1 x
′ y
s2 z
′ w

t1 t2
s1 x
′ y′
s2 z
′ w′
For a data set to be rationalizable by a utility function that is weakly separable across
states, it is clear that GARP should be satisfied by O, and it should also be satisfied when the
data is restricted to each state; in other words, Os1 =
{(
pis1 , c
i
s1
)}
i∈I (where p
i
s1
= (pi11, p
i
12)
and cis1 = (c
i
11, c
i
12)) and Os2 =
{(
pis2 , c
i
s2
)}
i∈I must both obey GARP. However, these three
conditions together are not sufficient to guarantee weak separability.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for weak separability can be found in Quah (2014).
We shall now describe that test, focusing on the case of state separability. First, we must find
a complete and transitive relation, %s1 on Cs1 = {cis1}i∈I that extends the revealed preference
and revealed strict preference relations on Cs1 ,4 and another complete and transitive relation
on Cs2 = {cis2}i∈I that extends the revealed preference and revealed strict preference relations
Cs2 . Based on %s1 and %s2 , we then construct a revealed preference relation on C such that
ci is revealed preferred to cj if there exist cks1 ∈ Cs1 and c`s2 ∈ Cs2 obeying the following
conditions: (i) (pis1 , p
i
s2
) · (cis1 , cis2) ≥ (pis1 , pis2) · (cks1 , c`s2); (ii) cks1 %s1 cjs1 ; and (iii) c`s2 %s2 cjs2 .
We say that ci is revealed strictly preferred to cj if either the inequality in (i) is strict, or
either of the preferences in (ii) and (iii) are strict. Quah (2014) shows that if %s1 and %s2
could be found so that the resulting revealed relations admit no cycles in the sense of (4),
4The complete and transitive relation %s1 extends the revealed preference relations if cis1 %s1 (s1) cjs1 if
cis1 is revealed preferred (revealed strictly preferred) to c
j
s1 .
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then the data is rationalizable by a utility function that is weakly separable across states.5
(It is clear that this condition is also necessary.)
If a subject has a utility function that is weakly separable across states, then it would be
natural to expect the sub-utility functions (which are defined on consumption streams over
time) to exhibit impatience. This means that given a larger quantity x and a smaller quantity
y, an impatient subject would prefer the larger quantity early and the smaller quantity later.
Property 3: Impatience. x ≥ y implies υ (x, y) ≥ υ (y, x) , and υ˜ (x, y) ≥ υ˜ (y, x).
Similar to the test for weak separability, the test for this property involves strengthening
the revealed preference conditions and then testing for the absence of cycles. We focus
our discussion on consumption streams in state 1. For cis1 and c
j
s2
in Cs1 , we say that
cis1 = (c
i
11, c
i
12) is revealed preferred to c
j
s1
= (cj11, c
j
12) if either (i) p
i
s1
· cis1 ≥ pis1 · cjs1 or (ii)
pis1 · cis1 ≥ pis1 · (cj12, cj11) and cj12 > cj11. In addition, cis1 is revealed strictly preferred to cjs1 if
either (ii) holds or the inequality in (i) is strict. With these modified definitions of revealed
preference, it is straightforward to check that the no-cycling condition (4) is necessary for
rationalization by a well-behaved utility function υ exhibiting impatience; furthermore, this
condition is also sufficient for rationalization by a utility function with these properties (see
Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017)). Figure 1.b depicts a dataset with two observations that
obeys GARP but cannot be rationalized with an impatient utility function.
In the case where there is weak separability across time, the sub-utility functions ought
to be symmetric since the two states are equiprobable in our experiment.
Property 4: Symmetry. ω (x, y) = ω (y, x) and ω˜ (x, y) = ω˜ (y, x), for any x, y ∈ R+.
To explain the test for this property, we focus our discussion on contingent consumption
at date 1. Let Ct1 = {cit1}i∈I , where cit1 = (ci11, ci21). For cit1 and cjt1 in Ct1 , we define cit1 as
revealed preferred to cjt1 if either (i) p
i
t1
· cit1 ≥ pit1 · cjt1 or (ii) pit1 · cit1 ≥ pit1 · (cj21, cj11). In
addition, cit1 is revealed strictly preferred to c
j
t1 if either (i) or (ii) holds with strict inequality.
With these modified definitions of revealed preference, it is straightforward to check that the
no-cycling condition (4) is necessary for rationalization by a well-behaved and symmetric
utility function ω; less obviously, this condition is also sufficient (see Nishimura, Ok, and
Quah (2017)). Figure 1.c gives an example of a dataset with two observations that obeys
GARP but is not rationalizable with a symmetric utility function.
Lastly, it would be natural to hypothesize that any sub-utility over consumption streams
is state independent, in the sense that υ = υ˜, and that any sub-utility over contingent
consumption would be time-invariant, in the sense that ω = ω˜,
5Notice that this test is computationally more demanding than the GARP test because in principle one
needs to go through all the possible extensions of the revealed preference relations and check for cycles before
one could definitively reject weak separability.
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Property 5: State-Independent Time Preference. υ = υ˜.
Property 6: Time-Invariant Risk Preference. ω = ω˜.
Property 5 can be tested by pooling Os1 and Os2 into a single data set and then
checking if it is rationalizable, either with a well-behaved utility function or a well-behaved
and impatient utility function. Similarly, time-invariance can be tested by pooling Ot1 and
Ot2 .
Lastly, we should mention that even though throughout this subsection we have confined
our discussion to testing for exact rationalizability, it is possible to modify these tests to
measure the critical cost efficiency index when exact rationalizability fails. The approach is
broadly the same as that (described at the end of Section 3.1) for the standard GARP test.
4 Results
4.1 Aggregate Behavior
This subsection provides a brief summary of aggregate behavior. Figure 2 plots the average
allocation of tokens for each of the four commodities under each price.6 Two patterns arise.
First, the average allocation is lower when the price is higher, suggesting that the law of
demand is satisfied in the aggregate level. Second, at any given price, the allocation to the
early time point is larger than that to the late time point, which is indicative evidence that
subjects are on average impatient.
We further conduct regression analyses with the tokens allocated to each commodity as
dependent variable and the prices for all the commodities as independent variable. We apply
a Tobit regression model with censoring at both 0 and 100, given the concern of corner choices.
From the results reported in Table 1 below, we observe that the tokens allocated to each
commodity is negatively affected by its own price, and positive affected by the price of the
other three commodities. Moreover, the cross-price effect is stronger if the two commodities
are within same time period, compared to when they are within the same state. This suggests
that the motive for diversification across states is stronger than the motive for smoothing
across time points.
One common issue with convex budget design is the prevalence of corner choices. For
example, Chakraborty et al. (2016) examine the external consistency and internal consistency
of convex time budget experiments. In particular, they find substantial violation of wealth
monotonicity, demand monotonicity, and impatience for subjects making interior choices.
6This is computed as the simple average across all observations and all subjects, without regard to the
other prevailing prices.
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Figure 2: Average Tokens Allocated to Each Commodity. Average tokens are calculated by
pooling all subjects’ choices, and plotted for each price and each of the four commodities.
In our setting, an observation (pi, ci) is classified as a corner choice if the subject allocates
0 token to at least one commodity. We find that on average 76.7 percent of the subjects’
choices are corner for a given price vector, 49 percent of the subjects make corner choices for
all price vectors, and 91 percent of the subjects make at least one corner choice in the 52 price
vectors. We separate the analysis for those with and without corner choices in Appendix B
(Table B1, B2), and find that our main observations remain intact.
4.2 Revealed Preference Analysis
In this subsection, we report the results of the revealed preference tests for the properties
identified in Section 3.2. As we have pointed out, all of the properties listed there must hold
if the agent is maximizing a discount expected utility function. The most basic tests concern
the existence of sub-utility functions, either defined over dated consumption (conditional on
a state) or contingent consumption (at a given date).
First, we focus on the existence and behavior of sub-utility functions in each state. Note
that the existence of these sub-utility functions is necessary (though not sufficient) for
rationalization with a state separable utility function (of the form (6)). To be specific, we test
if there are sub-utility functions υ (υ˜) rationalizing the datasets Os1 (Os2). Table 2 reports
the results of these tests. At the CCEI level of 0.95, around 85 percent of the subjects have a
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Table 1: Regression Analysis on Price Effect.
Head/Early Tail/Early Head/Late Tail/Late
allocation allocation allocation allocation
Head/Early Price -38.831*** 3.902*** 31.237*** 2.367**
(3.872) (1.425) (2.584) (1.157)
Tail/Early Price 3.660*** -38.384*** 4.640*** 31.198***
(1.205) (3.497) (1.458) (2.715)
Head/Late Price 24.757*** 3.517*** -40.866*** 1.928
(2.138) (1.300) (4.447) (1.302)
Tail/Late Price 1.924** 23.524*** 3.750*** -39.549***
(0.862) (1.821) (1.305) (4.317)
constant 30.120*** 28.292*** 9.147** 12.055***
(2.846) (3.237) (3.737) (3.401)
Observations 4,223 4,223 4,223 4,223
Pseudo R-squared 0.0659 0.0689 0.0701 0.0745
Table 2: Impatience and State-Independent Time Preference.
CCEI 1 CCEI 0.99 CCEI 0.95 CCEI 0.90
Head Well-Behaved 0.689 0.796 0.854 0.912
Impatience 0.670 0.767 0.845 0.893
Tail Well-Behaved 0.650 0.806 0.864 0.903
Impatience 0.641 0.757 0.825 0.874
Pooled State-Independence 0.553 0.709 0.825 0.883
State-Ind. with Impatience 0.544 0.650 0.786 0.845
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well-behaved utility function in state Head and similar proportion in state Tail; if impatience
is imposed on the utility function, the pass rate drops (as it must) but very modestly. (Recall
from Section 3.2 that the existence of well-behaved sub-utility function in state k can be
ascertained by testing GARP on Osk and the existence of a well-behaved and impatient
sub-utility function in that state can be ascertained by testing a stronger version of GARP.)
We also repeat the tests pooling the data in the two states, in order to test for the existence
of a state independent sub-utility function; in this case, the pass rate is around 82 percent
and dropping slightly to 79 percent when impatience is imposed.7
Table 3: Symmetry and Time-Invariant Risk Preference.
CCEI 1 CCEI 0.99 CCEI 0.95 CCEI 0.90
Early Well-Behaved 0.485 0.621 0.718 0.816
Symmetry 0.194 0.262 0.379 0.408
Late Well-Behaved 0.272 0.350 0.408 0.456
Symmetry 0.155 0.175 0.214 0.262
Pooled Time-Independence 0.146 0.204 0.282 0.340
Time-Ind. with Symmetry 0.097 0.146 0.184 0.233
When a subject has an overall utility function that is weakly separable across time (see
(7)), he or she would have a sub-utility function at each date. This means that there are
sub-utility functions ω (ω˜) rationalizing the datasets Ot1 (Ot2). Table 3 reports the results of
the revealed preference tests at each time point. At the CCEI level of 0.95, 72 percent of all
subjects exhibit behavior rationalizable by a well-behaved utility function at the Early time
point, with the corresponding figure at the Late time point being 41 percent. These numbers
drop to 38 percent and 21 percent respectively after imposing symmetry. To check for the
existence of a time-invariant sub-utility function, we pool the observations (for each subject)
at the two time points into a single data set; in this case, 28 percent are rationalizable with a
well-behaved utility function, and the figure drops to 18 percent if symmetry is imposed.
It is clear from Tables 2 and 3 that while there is strong support for the existence of
sub-utility functions over consumption streams, the evidence in favor of the existence of
sub-utility functions over contingent consumption (at each date) is a lot weaker. Table
4 reinforces these findings by comparing the pass rates for each test with its power. The
latter is measured in two ways. In the first way, we generate datasets (each consisting of
41 observations) using random allocation decisions in which the tokens sum up to 100. In
the second way, we first pool the decisions made by all subjects in the experiment and then
generate datasets (of 41 observations each) by sampling from that set. Notice that for datasets
randomly generated according to the first method, the pass rate is essentially zero at the
7In Table A3 in the Appendix, we provide the exact CCEI of each subject.
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Table 4: Power Test.
Exp-Data Rdm-Sampled Rdm-Generated
Head
Well-Behaved 0.854 0.218 0.001
Impatience 0.845 0.203 0.000
Tail
Well-Behaved 0.864 0.256 0.000
Impatience 0.825 0.218 0.000
H&T Pooled
Well-Behaved 0.825 0.040 0.000
Impatience 0.786 0.035 0.000
Early
Well-Behaved 0.718 0.410 0.000
Symmetry 0.379 0.083 0.000
Late
Well-Behaved 0.408 0.290 0.000
Symmetry 0.214 0.016 0.000
E&L Pooled
Well-Behaved 0.282 0.035 0.000
Symmetry 0.184 0.000 0.000
Note. The table displays the pass rates (at CCEI 0.95) among experimental data, randomly
sampled data (using subject choices) and randomly generated data. The experimental data
consists of 103 datasets (from 103 subjects). For the randomly sampled data and randomly
generated data, estimated pass rates are obtained from more than 10000 generated datasets
in each case.
0.95 CCEI. For datasets randomly generated according to the second method, the pass rates
are higher but still low when compared against the pass rate (among subjects). Selten (1991)
proposes using the difference between the experimental pass rate and the pass rate from
randomly generated data as a measure of a model’s predictive power.8 Notice that all the
models (whether they involve state or time separability) do have predictive power in the sense
that the true pass rate exceeds the pass rates of the randomly generated data. Furthermore,
the state-separable hypothesis with state independence and impatience is obviously superior
in predictive power to the time-separable hypothesis with date independence and symmetry,
since 0.786− 0.035 > 0.184− 0.000.
Table 5: GARP and Separability.
CCEI 1 CCEI 0.99 CCEI 0.95 CCEI 0.90
Well-Behaved 0.631 0.757 0.903 0.971
State Separability 0.456 0.553 0.757 0.874
Time Separability 0.165 0.194 0.301 0.369
So far we have only checked whether datasets are consistent with the existence of sub-utility
functions, but have not actually tested whether each subject’s dataset is rationalizable by a
weakly separable utility function (either of the state-separable form (6) or the time-separable
8Selten (1991) provides an axiomatization of this index. A model’s predictive power is high if its pass rate
is high and it delivers sharp predictions in the sense that the pass rate for randomly generated data is low.
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form (7)), which requires the recovery, not just of sub-utility functions, but also of an
aggregator function. Table 5 displays the results of implementing the rationalizability test for
weakly separable utility functions proposed in Quah (2014). Notice that both state-separable
and time-separable utility functions are special cases of well-behaved utility functions and
therefore the pass rate of the latter (which exceeds 90 percent at CCEI of 0.95) must be higher
than the other two. However, while 75 percent of all subjects display behavior consistent
with a state separable utility function, the corresponding figure for time separable utility is
only 30 percent.
Table 6: Individual Type Analysis (pass rates at CCEI 0.95)
Well-behaved State separable Time separable # of subjects
Pass Pass Pass 27
Pass Pass Fail 51
Pass Fail Pass 4
Pass Fail Fail 11
Fail Fail Fail 10
This disparity is in some ways even more starkly displayed in Table 6, which counts the
number of subjects who pass/fail the three models (at CCEI of 0.95). Notice that while 51
subjects are consistent with the state-separable model but not the time-separable model, only
four subjects are consistent with the time-consistent model but not the state-separable model.
So the usefulness of the model in explaining subject behavior appears to be very modest and
certainly pales in comparison with the state-separable model.
5 Conclusion
We conduct an experiment to elicit preferences of subjects over risky consumption streams.
Using recently developed revealed preference tests, we check for the consistency of subject
behavior with a variety of preference hypotheses. Our results broadly support the hypothesis
that intertemporal preferences under risk are separable across states, but there is little
evidence to support separability across time. This is the source of the failure of the discounted
expected utility model to explain subject behavior. Furthermore, we find that the sub-utility
functions over consumption streams are state independent and exhibit impatience.
Broadly speaking, our framework and testing methods can be applied to analyze preferences
in other contexts where the pattern of separability is a central issue. For example, in the case
of social preferences in risky environments (Fudenberg and Levine, 2012; Saito, 2013; Brock,
Andreas, and Ozbay, 2013), one important question is whether and how the decision maker
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trades off between ex ante and ex post fairness concerns; ex ante fairness would suggest a
preference that is separable across individuals, while ex post fairness suggests a preference
that is separable across states.
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Appendix: Supplementary Tables
Table A1: Price Effect with only Interior Choices.
Head/Early Tail/Early Head/Late Tail/Late
allocation allocation allocation allocation
Head/Early Price -9.247*** 3.149*** 5.900*** 0.198
(1.802) (1.014) (1.214) (0.924)
Tail/Early Price -0.105 -8.904*** 3.084*** 5.925***
(0.937) (1.552) (0.776) (1.259)
Head/Late Price 5.730*** 1.683* 9.986*** 2.572***
(1.259) (0.993) (1.693) (0.830)
Tail/Late Price 1.440* 7.251*** 1.144 -9.836***
(0.762) (1.550) (0.706) (1.598)
constant 27.803*** 21.167*** 24.621** 26.409***
(2.015) (2.353) (1.997) (2.218)
Observations 984 984 984 984
Pseudo R-squared 0.210 0.248 0.236 0.242
Table A2: Price Effect with only Corner Choices.
Head/Early Tail/Early Head/Late Tail/Late
allocation allocation allocation allocation
Head/Early Price -61.781*** 4.484** 51.419*** 4.053**
(7.105) (2.067) (2.728) (1.782)
Tail/Early Price 5.488*** -59.966*** 8.861*** 54.769***
(1.787) (6.305) (2.516) (2.587)
Head/Late Price 36.298*** 4.855** -97.729*** -1.250
(2.782) (1.901) (8.924) (2.014)
Tail/Late Price 3.229** 31.691*** 8.534*** -102.425***
(1.334) (2.336) (2.213) (9.176)
constant 31.427*** 33.974*** 13.811** 27.887***
(3.792) (4.936) (5.498) (6.056)
Observations 3,239 3,239 3,239 3,239
Pseudo R-squared 0.0965 0.0967 0.128 0.147
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Table A3: Power Test (at CCEI 0.95 and 0.90)
Exp-Data Rdn-Sampled Rdn-Generated
Head
Well-Behaved 0.854 0.218 0.001
(0.912) (0.423) (0.007)
Impatience 0.845 0.203 0.000
(0.893) (0.396) (0.001)
Tail
Well-Behaved 0.864 0.256 0.000
(0.903) (0.411) (0.008)
Impatience 0.825 0.218 0.000
(0.874) (0.377) (0.000)
H&T Pooled
Well-Behaved 0.825 0.040 0.000
(0.883) (0.154) (0.000)
Impatience 0.786 0.035 0.000
(0.845) (0.140) (0.000)
Early
Well-Behaved 0.718 0.410 0.000
(0.816) (0.657) (0.007)
Symmetry 0.379 0.083 0.000
(0.408) (0.178) (0.000)
Late
Well-Behaved 0.408 0.290 0.000
(0.456) (0.455) (0.009)
Symmetry 0.214 0.016 0.000
(0.262) (0.028) (0.000)
E&L Pooled
Well-Behaved 0.282 0.035 0.000
(0.340) (0.144) (0.000)
Symmetry 0.184 0.000 0.000
(0.233) (0.001) (0.000)
Note. This table is a longer version of Table 4 in the main part of the paper. It displays
the passing rates among experimental data, randomly sampled data (using subject choices)
and randomly generated data. The experimental data consists of 103 datasets (from 103
subjects). For the randomly sampled data and randomly generated data, estimated pass
rates are obtained from more than 10000 generated datasets in each case. The percentage
in each row without the brackets is the pass rate at CCEI 0.95, and the percentage in
brackets is the pass rate at CCEI 0.90.
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Table A4: Detailed CCEI Results.
Overall Head Tail H&T Pooled Early Late E&L Pooled
W-B W-B Imp W-B Imp W-B Imp W-B Sym W-B Sym W-B Sym
Subject 1 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 3 0.87 0.74 0.74 0.95 0.95 0.74 0.74 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.80 0.50
Subject 5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 7 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 8 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 10 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 11 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
Subject 12 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 13 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 14 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.83
Subject 15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 16 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 17 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 18 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.40 0.91 0.40
Subject 19 0.97 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.83 0.85 0.80 0.85 0.80
Subject 20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 21 0.95 0.92 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.84 0.76 1.00 0.80 0.84 0.76
Subject 22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 23 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 24 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.93 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.94
Subject 25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Subject 26 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 27 0.94 0.79 0.79 0.88 0.84 0.78 0.78 0.96 0.70 0.70 0.65 0.70 0.65
Subject 28 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 29 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 31 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 32 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.87 0.80
Subject 33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 34 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 35 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.80
Subject 36 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 37 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 38 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 39 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 41 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 42 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 43 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.87 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 44 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.87 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 45 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.91 0.97 0.91
Subject 46 0.88 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.96 0.64
Subject 47 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Subject 48 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 49 1.00 0.90 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.89 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 51 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80
Subject 52 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 53 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Subject 54 0.98 0.86 0.72 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.72 0.94 0.82 0.92 0.80 0.87 0.80
Subject 55 1.00 0.95 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
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Table A4 continued.
Overall Head Tail H&T Pooled Early Late E&L Pooled
W-B W-B Imp W-B Imp W-B Imp W-B Sym W-B Sym W-B Sym
Subject 56 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 57 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 58 0.94 0.78 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.71 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.71
Subject 59 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80
Subject 61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.89 0.89 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 62 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.92
Subject 63 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 64 0.97 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.80 0.95 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 65 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 67 0.97 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.84 0.92 0.84 0.91 0.84 0.89 0.79 0.89 0.79
Subject 68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 69 0.92 0.80 0.60 0.87 0.87 0.60 0.60 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.92 0.79 0.75
Subject 70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 71 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.80 0.62 0.91 0.80 0.80 0.62
Subject 72 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.98 0.80
Subject 73 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.88 0.97 0.88 0.97 0.88
Subject 74 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 75 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 76 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.50 0.87 0.50
Subject 77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 78 0.94 0.80 0.76 0.88 0.87 0.80 0.76 0.90 0.87 0.98 0.92 0.90 0.87
Subject 79 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.82 1.00 0.64 0.92 0.64
Subject 81 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 84 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 85 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80
Subject 86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.64 1.00 0.80 0.92 0.64
Subject 87 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 88 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 89 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.94
Subject 90 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 91 0.89 0.73 0.73 0.82 0.82 0.73 0.73 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Subject 92 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.82 0.80
Subject 93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 95 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Subject 96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.64 0.80 0.64
Subject 97 0.91 0.89 0.80 0.89 0.63 0.79 0.63 0.62 0.40 0.87 0.67 0.62 0.40
Subject 98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95
Subject 99 0.96 0.91 0.87 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.95 0.89 0.80 0.69 0.80 0.69
Subject 100 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 101 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Subject 102 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80
Subject 103 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
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